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THE OVERLOOKED BENEFITS OF
THE BLACKSTONE PRINCIPLE
John Bronsteen* & Jonathan S. Masur**
There are two ways to read Daniel Epps's fascinating and provoca-
tive article, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice.1 One way
is this: the article shows that the Blackstone principle - the principle
that more effort should be made to avoid false convictions than false
acquittals - may well produce many consequences that are often
overlooked. Some of those overlooked consequences are positive, oth-
ers are negative, and it is unclear whether those overlooked conse-
quences make the principle more or less desirable on the whole than it
was previously thought to be. 2 We agree with those points, and in
making them Epps contributes significantly to the literature on crimi-
nal justice.
The other way to read Epps's article is this: the article claims that
the Blackstone principle may well have bad overall consequences, or
at least that the principle has worse consequences (especially for inno-
cent criminal defendants) than it is typically assumed to have. We do
not think those conclusions follow from the principle's overlooked ef-
fects that Epps identifies. So in our view, the best way to read his ar-
ticle is the first way: Epps shows that the Blackstone principle has
more complicated effects than people realize, and those effects may be
positive, negative, or neutral on the whole.
Because Epps focuses almost exclusively on the negative features of
the overlooked effects, we focus on their positive features. First, we
discuss the crime reduction and other benefits that could result from
the effects Epps identifies. Second, we explain how social science evi-
dence on prison and well-being reveals unappreciated benefits of the
Blackstone principle. Epps is right that the Blackstone principle
should be viewed from a dynamic perspective. But that perspective
may serve to reveal the principle's unnoticed strengths, even more
than its weaknesses.
* Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
** John P. Wilson Professor of Law and David and Celia Hilliard Research Scholar, Universi-
ty of Chicago Law School.
1 128 HARV. L. REV. io65 (20,5).
2 Indeed, the answer may depend at least in part on what one's previous view of the principle
was. The principle has many defenders but also, as Epps notes, some staunch critics. E.g., id. at
1o89-92.
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I. POSITIVE DYNAMIC EFFECTS
The main argument against the Blackstone principle is that it in-
creases crime. 3 That is, if procedural safeguards make it harder to
convict those accused of crimes, then there will be less deterrence and
incapacitation and therefore more law-breaking. One of Epps's main
points is that this increase in crime harms not only potential victims
but also criminal defendants - the very people the Blackstone princi-
ple is supposed to help. 4 This occurs, according to Epps, in large part
because society responds to increased crime by broadening criminal
statutes, reducing other procedural protections, and, most importantly,
increasing the length of prison sentences. 5
If Epps is right about all of this, however, then the broader crimi-
nal statutes, reduced procedural protections, and longer prison sen-
tences of the Blackstonian world themselves reduce crime via deter-
rence and (perhaps especially) incapacitation relative to the
alternatives in the non-Blackstonian world. So if the picture Epps
paints is right, then the Blackstonian world is one in which any would-
be criminal will be harder to convict in some ways but easier to con-
vict in other ways, and will face a longer sentence if convicted.
Whether that arrangement is better or worse than the one in a non-
Blackstonian world - in terms of crime reduction or otherwise - is
utterly uncertain. On the one hand, one might argue that certainty of
punishment deters crime more than does severity of punishment, and
that criminals are more likely to be convicted and punished in the non-
Blackstonian world (though that is far from certain).6 On the other
hand, one might argue that keeping would-be recidivists locked up for
long periods of time without having to release them, catch them again,
and convict them again each time, gives the Blackstonian world an
advantage. It is not clear which system, Blackstonian or non-
Blackstonian, is preferable.
In addition, a major benefit of the Blackstone principle is that
some potential innocent defendants are not even charged in a world
with the principle but would be charged and acquitted in a world
without it.' Being charged and acquitted is typically much worse for
someone than not being charged at all. The decision to charge imposes
substantial burdens on the accused, burdens that do not entirely dissi-
pate even if the individual is eventually acquitted.8 Epps disagrees,
3 See, e.g., id.
4 See id. at 1o99-1102.
5 See id. at I I02-o6.
6 E.g., id. at 1095.
7 Id. at iiii, I14 n.239.
8 See Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1297, 1301-14 (2000).
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dismissing the concern with only this sentence: "But the costs to such
innocents are likely not large, because in a non-Blackstonian system an
arrest without a conviction would carry less stigma than it would in
our world." 9  This rejoinder is surprising, however, because Epps
himself acknowledges the potential weakness of his claim about
changes in stigma: "[S]ome of the principle's dynamic costs may be
fairly marginal. For example, the additional stigma that acquitted in-
nocent defendants suffer may be real but small in any given case."1°
If Epps is right that there would not be much difference between the
stigma of being charged but acquitted in a Blackstonian and non-
Blackstonian world, it undercuts his claim that the benefit of avoiding
a charge in a non-Blackstonian world is "likely not large. "11
On the other hand, if the stigma of an arrest - as well as that of a
conviction 12 - turns out to be much smaller in a world without the
Blackstone principle, then the Blackstone principle creates an over-
looked deterrent benefit by increasing the stigmatic harm that would-
be criminals face if they are caught. This factor belongs in Epps's cal-
culus of costs and benefits because it is Epps himself who argues that
the factor exists.13 Once these additional benefits are added to the
accounting, the idea of moving to a non-Blackstonian world becomes
less appealing. Indeed, it is possible that a dynamic analysis of the
type Epps suggests would provide even stronger justification for the
Blackstone principle than scholars have previously supposed.
II. HEDONICS AND PRISON
We can try to obtain some purchase on the competing dynamic
effects of the Blackstone principle by looking to the literature on he-
donic psychology. Analysis of the hedonic effects of prison suggests
that the Blackstone principle may be helping innocent defendants
far more than it harms them. One of Epps's central points is that
there is a tradeoff between the length of prison sentences and the like-
lihood of conviction. Epps argues that if we were to do away with the
Blackstone principle, higher conviction rates would enable shorter
prison sentences for individuals who were convicted. 14 This would
provide a benefit to innocent defendants who would be convicted in
either world, counterbalancing (at least to some degree) the fact that a
higher percentage of innocents would be convicted in a non-
Blackstonian world. We do not know whether sentences would actu-
9 Epps, supra note i, at 114 n.239.
10 Id. at 1122.
11 Id. at 114 n.239.
12 E.g., id. at 1o99-1102.
13 See id.
14 Id. at II12.
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ally be reduced, but let us suppose that Epps is correct. The question
then becomes: How much will innocent defendants benefit from short-
er prison sentences in a non-Blackstonian world? Will this benefit be
substantial, or will it be dwarfed by the increased risk of wrongful
convictions in the first place?
It is impossible to know how many more innocent defendants will
be wrongfully convicted in a non-Blackstonian world, so we cannot
compute that side of the balance sheet. But research from hedonic
psychology sheds considerable light on the issue of how much wrong-
fully convicted defendants will benefit from shorter prison sentences.
As we have explored in depth elsewhere, the difference between the
respective harm of long and short prison sentences is far smaller than
most people assume 15 - scholars, judges, legislators, and citizens in-
cluded. There are two reasons for this. First, people adapt to many
aspects of life in prison.16 They form social networks, develop coping
mechanisms, and generally become accustomed to life behind bars.
The tenth year that someone spends in prison is not nearly as bad for
that person as the first. Second, having been in prison causes people to
suffer a wide variety of negative effects that persist even after they are
released.17 Ex-prisoners have trouble preserving or reestablishing fam-
ily and social relationships; they have difficulty finding work; and they
are often afflicted with serious chronic diseases."' Surprisingly, these
effects are almost equally pronounced whether the individual spent
one year in prison or ten (or twenty).19 These types of harms are also
very difficult to adapt to, and they exert a consistently negative force
on former inmates' lives years after they have been released. 20
This means that even if Epps were right to suggest that a wrongly
convicted defendant might face a twenty-year sentence in a
Blackstonian world and a ten-year sentence in a non-Blackstonian
world, the practical difference between the two sentences would be
much smaller than one might imagine. The last ten years in prison are
not as bad as the first ten years, and even after a prisoner is released
15 John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment,
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2009).
16 See id. at 1046-49.
17 Id. at 1049.
18 See id. at 1Q49-52.
19 Id. at 1oo. It is possible that the negative effects of prison on relationships and employ-
ment might be ameliorated somewhat if, as Epps postulates, eliminating the Blackstone principle
mitigated the stigma associated with prison. However, we suspect that reduced stigma - if in
fact it materializes - will have a small impact on these harms. The reason is that they are not
caused entirely (or necessarily even predominantly) by stigma. Rather, prison is maladaptive to
regular life: the coping strategies that allow prisoners to survive in prison make it harder for them
to function on the outside. This, in turn, makes interpersonal relationships and employment more
difficult to maintain after release.
20 Id. at 1049-55.
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(earlier, in the non-Blackstonian world), the years after release are not
as good as one might expect. 21  To be sure, it is very likely worse to
serve a longer sentence than a shorter one. But the amount by which
it is worse is smaller than almost everyone assumes. And that amount
is dwarfed by the benefit (to an innocent person) of never having been
incarcerated in the first place. Accordingly, if the Blackstone principle
decreases the chance that an innocent defendant will go to prison by
(for instance) twenty-five percent, but increases by a proportionate
amount the sentence that such a defendant will serve if convicted, then
that accounting cuts dramatically in favor of the Blackstone princi-
ple. 22 The sentence reductions in a non-Blackstonian world would
have to be enormous and wholly disproportionate to the increased rate
of conviction for innocent defendants to benefit.23
III. CONCLUSION
Epps has written a deeply interesting, provocative, and novel arti-
cle on a topic that many might have felt was well settled. His article is
thus a valuable contribution. In this Response, we've endeavored to
demonstrate that by focusing almost exclusively on the unexplored
negative effects of the Blackstone principle, Epps overlooks the posi-
tive effects of the very same phenomena he believes cause the Black-
stone principle's negative effects. Of course, it remains impossible to
know whether the Blackstone principle's benefits exceed its costs, in
large degree because the magnitudes of these competing effects are im-
possible to determine. Where data do exist, however - in the form of
hedonic psychology studies of prison and its effects - those data cut
strongly in favor of the Blackstone principle and against any legal
change that would send a higher percentage of innocent defendants to
prison. In the end, it is not clear whether Epps's dynamic analysis,
even if correct, would render the Blackstone principle more or less de-
sirable than it was previously thought to be.
21 Id.
22 Indeed, one could argue on this ground that the Blackstone principle should be strength-
ened and that the status quo does not do enough to protect innocent defendants from wrongful
convictions.
23 The hedonics literature would not necessarily support the Blackstone principle if Epps were
right that the principle increases the number (while reducing the rate) of false convictions due to
increasing crime. Epps, supra note i, at f112-13. But as we explained in Part I of this Response,
it is utterly uncertain whether the Blackstone principle results in more crime even if Epps is right
about the dynamic effects that flow from the principle.
2GI5]
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW AND THE PURPORTED
SHIFT AWAY FROM "EXCEPTIONALISM"
Curtis A. Bradley*
The field of "foreign relations law" encompasses a variety of con-
stitutional, statutory, and common law rules and doctrines that regu-
late how the United States interacts with the rest of the world.1 In
their article on The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, Profes-
sors Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth contend that there has been
a revolution in U.S. foreign relations law during the past twenty-five
years.2 In particular, they claim that there has been a shift away from
treating foreign relations law issues as "exceptional" toward treating
them as "normal" - that is, "as if they were run-of-the-mill domestic
policy issues, suitable for judicial review and governed by ordinary
separation of powers and statutory interpretation principles."' 3 The
authors further contend that this trend of normalization is likely to
continue, and that such a development should be welcomed and
encouraged.4
Normalization makes a number of important contributions. It use-
fully seeks to develop a more rigorous definition of the idea of "foreign
relations exceptionalism." It ties together various Supreme Court de-
cisions since the end of the Cold War that might otherwise have
seemed unconnected. Perhaps most notably, its critique of treating a
general category of "foreign relations law" as legally distinct from a
general category of "domestic law" is powerful and likely to have last-
ing significance. Despite these virtues, the article has some conceptual
and methodological limitations. In particular, its definition of foreign
relations exceptionalism is underinclusive in certain respects and
overinclusive in others; its descriptive account is too exclusively fo-
cused on the Supreme Court and is not entirely persuasive even on its
own terms; and its lack of an underlying theory weakens its empirical,
predictive, and normative claims.
* William Van Alstyne Professor, Duke Law School. For their helpful comments and sugges-
tions, I would like to thank Kathy Bradley, Jean Galbraith, Jack Goldsmith, Larry Helfer, Eric
Posner, Neil Siegel, and Paul Stephan.
1 See generally CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
(5th ed. 2014).
2 See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128
HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2Q15).
3 Id. at igor.
4 Id. at 1904.
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I. CONTINUING UNCERTAINTIES
ABOUT "EXCEPTIONALISM"
At the heart of Normalization is a descriptive claim about the rise
and fall of something called "foreign relations exceptionalism." The
authors graciously credit me with coining the term, and they accurate-
ly note that I did not attempt to define the concept with much specific-
ity.5 Instead, I simply described it as "the view that the federal gov-
ernment's foreign affairs powers are subject to a different, and
generally more relaxed, set of constitutional restraints than those that
govern its domestic powers," 6 and I argued that scholars often seemed
opportunistic in their embrace or rejection of the concept.7
Sitaraman and Wuerth seek to define foreign relations
exceptionalism somewhat differently, and with more precision. In par-
ticular, they propose to limit the concept so that it covers only differ-
ences in the treatment of domestic and foreign relations law that are
based on "distinctive functional, doctrinal, or methodological analy-
sis," and not "differences that emerge from standard analysis, such as
constitutional text and original history."8 In making this distinction,
the authors seek to avoid having to consider and evaluate the extent to
which the Constitution itself accords exceptional treatment to foreign
relations law. Under their approach, if "standard" constitutional in-
terpretation leads a court to conclude (for example) that the President
has broad foreign relations powers, or that there should be differential
treatment of statutes and treaties, "[t]his is not exceptionalism." 9
While Sitaraman and Wuerth's effort to refine the concept of
exeptionalism is commendable, the distinction they attempt to draw
does not seem tenable. As an initial matter, their definition of
exceptionalism is underinclusive because assumptions about functional
and other differences between domestic and foreign relations - as-
sumptions that the authors label as exceptionalist reasoning - perva-
sively affect "standard constitutional interpretation." 10 This phenom-
enon is especially evident in structural constitutional reasoning, which
is one of the standard "modalities" of constitutional interpretation.11
5 See id. at igo6.
6 Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. io8g, io96
(I999).
7 See Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Concep-
tion, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 557-6i (iggg).
8 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at i9o7.
9 Id. at i9o8; see also id. (referring to "generally applicable analysis"); id. at ig6g (referring
to "standard constitutional interpretation"); id. at 1975 (referring to "generally applicable consti-
tutional analysis").
10 Id. at g6g.
11 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-17 (iggi). At times,
Sitaraman and Wuerth appear to be assuming that "standard constitutional interpretation" is
20151
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To take one of many examples, when the Supreme Court stated in
United States v. Belmont 12 that "the external powers of the United
States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies," 13 it
was expressing a view about constitutional text, history, and structure,
but its view about these materials was colored by a sharp conceptual
distinction between domestic and foreign relations. Similar observa-
tions can be made about the constitutional reasoning in other canoni-
cal foreign relations law decisions, such as Missouri v. Holland14 and
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.15  Tellingly, Sitaraman
and Wuerth themselves frequently label examples of structural consti-
tutional reasoning as exceptionalist.16
Sitaraman and Wuerth recognize this potential objection to their
proposed definition of foreign relations exceptionalism, but they con-
tend that broadening the concept to include differential treatment that
is the result of standard constitutional analysis "proves too much" be-
cause it would cause the concept to "lose[] much of its usefulness." 17
It is not clear, however, why this is so: if nothing else, pointing out
that the Constitution is being interpreted in foreign relations cases in
ways that do not track how it is being interpreted in potentially analo-
gous domestic cases may place a burden of justification on those argu-
ing for such differential interpretation, especially if, as many scholars
have argued in recent years, the dividing line between domestic and
foreign relations has become blurred. 8 In any event, by excluding
from their focus the question of whether the Constitution should be in-
terpreted as treating foreign relations law exceptionally, Sitaraman and
Wuerth are artificially excluding many of the core issues in the field.
In a different sense, however, the authors' proposed definition of
exceptionalism is overinclusive, at least in the way that the authors
apply it. A court's treatment of an issue of foreign relations law is not
"exceptional" as compared with its treatment of domestic law unless
the issue is comparable to the domestic law issue. But it is not clear
that this is true for some of the authors' examples of exceptionalism.
limited to textualist and originalist reasoning. See, e.g., Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at
i9o7-o8. If so, it is not clear why they are making that assumption. In any event, it is likely that
textualist and originalist reasoning is affected by other modalities of constitutional interpretation.
See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional
Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213 (2Q15).
12 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
13 Id. at 331.
14 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
15 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
16 See, e.g., Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1915 (discussing Curtiss-Wright); id. at
1915-16 (discussing Belmont); id. at iQ16-i7 (discussing Missouri v. Holland).
17 Id. at r9ro.
18 That was, in fact, the thrust of my critique of exceptionalism in the Iggos. See, e.g., Curtis
A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 461 (1998).
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For instance, the authors argue that deference to executive branch
treaty interpretations should be subject to the precise requirements
and limitations of the Chevron framework governing deference to
agency interpretations of statutes. 19 If the treaty context is not fully
analogous to the statutory context, however, it would not necessarily
be "exceptional" to apply a different deference regime to the treaty
context. In fact, the treaty context is not analogous in certain ways,
such as in how the relevant text is developed (through executive
branch-managed negotiation with other countries) and in the implica-
tions of adopting a particular interpretation (which, for treaties, inher-
ently involve international reciprocity considerations). 20 Similarly, the
authors suggest that it is exceptionalist to give more weight to histori-
cal practice in constitutional interpretation in the foreign relations area
than in the domestic area.2 1 But part of the typical doctrinal test for
crediting such "historical gloss" concerns whether Congress has acqui-
esced in the practice.22 If it turns out that Congress has acquiesced
more in unilateral executive action in the foreign affairs area than in
the domestic area - a possibility that the authors do not explore -
one should see gloss having a more prominent role there, and that
would not be exceptionalist.
Sitaraman and Wuerth contend that, regardless of whether one
agrees with their empirical and normative claims, their definition of
foreign relations exceptionalism "is an independent contribution. '23 It
turns out, however, that they are more successful in highlighting the
conceptual uncertainties than in resolving them, and these continuing
uncertainties make it more difficult to evaluate their other claims.
II. LIMITS OF THE DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT
OF "NORMALIZATION"
The descriptive claim in Normalization is that there has been a
shift during the past twenty-five years toward "normalizing" foreign
relations law - that is, toward treating it like ordinary domestic law.
The authors describe this shift as occurring in three waves: in the im-
mediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, during the post-
19 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1968-7o.
20 See Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 SuP. CT. REV. 131, '57-6o.
It is therefore artificial to make a sharp distinction, as the authors do, between "a constitutional
basis" for deference and the view "that the government offers expertise and accountability that
the courts do not, making deference appropriate." Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1969.
21 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at IQo9.
22 See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Pow-
ers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 432 (2Q12).
23 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1902.
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September ii War on Terror, and during the Roberts Court. 24  The
methodology employed by the authors to support this claim is an ex-
amination of Supreme Court decisions from the past quarter-century.
These decisions, the authors maintain, "form an unmistakable pattern
of normalization across the most important debates in foreign relations
law over the last century." 25
This Supreme Court-focused methodology is questionable, since
most of foreign relations law is developed, interpreted, and applied
outside the Supreme Court. One may see much less "normalization"
during the period in question by looking at the lower courts or political
branch practice. The political question doctrine, for example, has had
a more vibrant life in the lower courts during the relevant period than
in the Supreme Court, especially in cases touching on foreign rela-
tions.26 And, contrary to the views expressed in Normalization27 and
separately by one of its authors, 28 the lower courts have generally ac-
corded significant - and, indeed, often dispositive - deference to the
executive branch with respect to whether to accord immunity to for-
eign officials. 29
Even on its own terms, however, the picture presented in Normali-
zation is less clear than the authors suggest. For example, the authors
describe the period following the September ii attacks as witnessing a
surprising and expedited turn to normalization in the judicial treat-
ment of foreign relations law, as evidenced most notably by the Su-
preme Court's willingness to exercise judicial review over the execu-
tive detention and trial of alleged terrorists] 0 But this is a highly
contestable account of the Court's decisions. While the Court did in-
sist on the availability of judicial review over detainees held at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and required the President to obtain
more specific statutory authority for military trials of the detainees, the
Court otherwise left intact the executive branch's "War on Terror"
regime. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,3 1 for example, the Court accepted the
24 Id. at I919-35.
25 Id. at 1935.
26 See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note i, at 68-69 (providing examples).
27 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1974-75.
28 See Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case
Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 915 (2011).
29 See CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 263-64
& n.I85 (2d ed. 2015) (collecting cases). The Supreme Court could be seen as having invited this
deference when it noted in Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010), that courts had deferred to
executive branch suggestions of foreign official immunity prior to Congress's enactment of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, see id. at 2285, and that the Supreme Court had "been given
no reason to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to eliminate, the State Depart-
ment's role in determinations regarding individual official immunity," id. at 2291.
30 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1902-03.
31 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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foundational premise of the Bush Administration's approach, namely
that the United States was in a "war" and that the authority conveyed
by Congress in its post-September ii authorization of force should be
construed to encompass the "incident[s] of waging war. '32 Moreover,
since Boumediene v. Bush,33 the Court has left the determination of
the President's detention authority to common law development in the
D.C. federal courts, which have employed a broad and deferential ap-
proach to executive detention authority.34 The result is that the execu-
tive branch has been able to hold hundreds of individuals for years,
mostly without trial, despite the fact that many of them are not formal
members of any enemy armed forces. Instead of seeing this period as
one of "normalization," one might describe it as one of the more ex-
ceptional periods in the history of American law. 35
The picture with respect to foreign relations federalism since the
end of the Cold War is also not as clear as the authors suggest. In-
deed, two of the most significant federalism decisions in the period -
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,36 and American Insurance
Ass'n v. Garamendi37 - are notable for how exceptionalist they were
in their willingness to infer preemption of state law. Sitaraman and
Wuerth emphasize the Court's more recent decision in Chamber of
Commerce v. Whiting,38 which held that an Arizona law relating to the
licensing of state businesses that employ unauthorized aliens was not
preempted by federal immigration law. 39 But the more significant
immigration decision in this period was Arizona v. United States,40 in
which the Court held that a number of widely publicized Arizona
measures relating to unauthorized aliens were preempted.4 1 Moreover,
in reaching this conclusion, the Court invoked the exceptionalist deci-
sion Curtiss-Wright in support of what it described as the govern-
ment's "inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations
32 See id. at 519 (plurality opinion). For extended consideration of these incidents of war,
see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terror-
ism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005). The Hamdi plurality also endorsed minimal due process
standards that were sensitive to the foreign relations context. See 542 U.S. at 531-35 (plurality
opinion).
33 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
34 See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 U.S. 866, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
35 The Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have also largely abstained from reviewing
U.S. government conduct in the War on Terror that takes place in foreign locations other than
Guantanamo. See, e.g., Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008) (U.S. transfer of custody in Iraq); Al
Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3 d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (U.S. detentions in Afghanistan).
36 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
37 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
3 1 3  S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
39 Id. at 1973.
40 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
41 Id. at 2510.
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with foreign nations. ' ' 42 While it is true that in Bond v. United
States43 the Court applied a domestic federalism presumption to
treaty-implementing legislation,** it is also true that the Court resisted
the temptation in that case to revisit what is often regarded as an
exceptionalist decision, Missouri v. Holland.45
The authors are on somewhat stronger ground in suggesting that
there has been reduced deference to the executive branch during this
post-Cold War period. But even here the picture is mixed. While the
Court gave surprisingly little deference to the Bush Administration's
interpretation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,4 6 it subsequently accorded "great weight" to the
Bush Administration's interpretation of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,47 and of the U.N.
Charter in Medellin v. Texas.4* The Court again reaffirmed the pro-
priety of this sort of strong treaty deference in Abbott v. Abbott49 in the
face of the dissent's critique of it.5o Moreover, contrary to the sugges-
tion in Normalization,5 1 the Court's disallowance in Medellin of execu-
tive branch preemption to enforce a non-self-executing treaty does not
represent a dramatic blow to executive power. As the Court empha-
sized, the executive action there was unprecedented. 52 What was more
noteworthy in Medellin was the Court's articulation of a broad "non-
self-execution" approach to treaties that distinguishes them from the
enforcement of federal statutes, 53 an approach that many observers
have criticized as unduly exceptional. 5 4
It is probably easiest to agree with the authors that the Court has
had a narrower view of nonjusticiability limitations in recent years,
with the Court's refusal to apply the political question doctrine in
42 Id. at 2498.
43 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
44 See id. at 2088-90.
45 See id. at 2087; see also Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1917 (noting that Holland
"seemed to rest both on textual and exceptionalist grounds"); id. at 1928 n.I73 (observing that
Holland was "arguably" an exceptionalist decision).
46 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
47 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
48 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
49 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
50 See id. at 1993; id. at 2006-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1930.
52 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 532.
53 See id. at 508-11 .
54 See, e.g., John T. Parry, Response, Rewriting the Roberts Court's Law of Treaties, 88 TEX.
L. REV. SEE ALSO 65, 74 (2010) ("Medellin creates a different structure for treaties [than for
statutes]."); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Less Than Zero?, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 563, 563 (2008)
("Medellin v. Texas is the first case in which the Supreme Court has denied a treaty-based claim
solely on the ground that the treaty relied upon was non-self-executing." (footnote omitted)).
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Zivotofsky v. Clinton55 being a prime example. (Indeed, it is hard to
imagine Normalization being written if Zivotofsky had come out the
other way.) It is worth noting, however, that the Supreme Court rare-
ly applied the political question doctrine even before the purported pe-
riod of normalization, and it famously declined to do so in INS v.
Chadha5 6 in i983 .5 1 Zivotofsky, moreover, presented a relatively unu-
sual situation in which the executive branch was asserting authority to
disregard a clear statutory provision, 5 something not presented in ear-
lier, "exceptionalist" foreign relations law decisions in which the Court
had invoked justiciability limitations, such as Goldwater v. Carter.59
The picture is also mixed with respect to other justiciability doctrines,
and signs of "normalization" may partly be a function of the particu-
lar cases that make up a relatively small set. In Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA, 60 for example, the Court applied a restrictive ap-
proach to standing in a case seeking to challenge the government's
electronic surveillance activities, noting that "we have often found a
lack of standing in cases in which the Judiciary has been requested to
review actions of the political branches in the fields of intelligence
gathering and foreign affairs.'61
I should emphasize that I am not claiming that all or even most of
the Supreme Court's decisions in this period prove exceptionalism
rather than normalization. My claim is simply that these decisions do
not offer clear support for the supposedly revolutionary shift postulat-
ed in Normalization.
III. AN OBSERVATION IN SEARCH OF A THEORY
The authors describe a purported normalization of foreign relations
law, but they do not offer a theory about why it has happened. They
make clear that they "do not seek here to explain why normalization is
taking place,"' 62 something that they say will be "left to another
day."' 63 In a paragraph in the introduction, the authors do note that
they "have a number of hypotheses: the perception of reduced risk of
55 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2Q12).
56 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
57 See id. at 940-43.
58 See Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1424.
59 See 444 U.S. 996 (r979) (mem.).
60 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2Q13).
61 Id. at 1147. The Supreme Court's reinvigoration in this period of the presumption against
extraterritorial application of federal statutes could also be described as reflecting exceptionalist
reasoning. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2Q13) (ex-
pressing concern about the "danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign
policy").
62 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1905.
63 Id. at 19o6.
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negative foreign affairs consequences after the Cold War, scholarly at-
tacks on exceptionalist doctrine, the rise of the conservative legal
movement, the Bush Administration's overreaching legal arguments
coupled with shocking uses of executive power, and the widespread
acceptance of Chevron." 64 But they do not return to these hypotheses.
While no article should be expected to do everything, the lack of an
explanatory theory presents particular problems for Normalization,
both in its historical account of the rise and fall of foreign relations
exceptionalism, and in its predictive and normative claims about fu-
ture directions of the law. Consider first the authors' account of the
rise of foreign relations exceptionalism. Without a theory about why
the courts embraced exceptionalism, the authors end up portraying it
as chiefly an implementation of the vision of Justice Sutherland, who
authored two of the early "exceptionalist" decisions after having de-
veloped a strong conceptual distinction between domestic and foreign
affairs in his writings before joining the Supreme Court. The authors
label this the "Sutherland revolution." 65 But this label does not tell us
why the other Justices went along with Justice Sutherland's views,
and why subsequent courts - over many decades - would have con-
tinued to express the same exceptionalist attitudes. 66 Without a sense
of the answer to those questions, it is difficult to evaluate the norma-
tive attractiveness of the exceptionalist period or the consequences of
abandoning it. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that
Sitaraman and Wuerth generally avoid taking a position on whether
the exceptionalist decisions were correctly decided.
The lack of a theoretical framework also makes it more difficult to
evaluate the authors' empirical claim that there has been a revolution-
ary shift in foreign relations law away from exceptionalism. As dis-
cussed above, the empirical case is uncertain even on its own terms.
In evaluating the evidence offered in Normalization, it would be useful
to have a sense of whether some underlying dynamic has changed. If
there has not been such a change, the pattern described in Normaliza-
tion may simply be (at most) the function of the particular cases that
produced a relatively small number of Supreme Court opinions with a
high degree of variance. If some dynamic has changed, one might ex-
pect that there would still be some cases that would be paradigmatic
foreign relations cases, and that these cases might continue to be treat-
ed exceptionally even if others are not. For reasons discussed above,
64 Id. at 1905-o6.
65 Id. at I91I.
66 Nor does it tell us why there were exceptionalist decisions and reasoning long before Justice
Sutherland's opinions. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians,
Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002).
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this sort of variegated pattern may be a more accurate empirical pic-
ture than what is portrayed in Normalization. Again, having a theory
about what is purportedly occurring would make it easier to evaluate
the evidence.
For similar reasons, the lack of a theory is problematic for the au-
thors' prediction of future judicial decisionmaking. The authors "sus-
pect and predict" that the "stirrings of normalization" "are likely to
be expanded to other areas of foreign relations law."' 67 But this pre-
diction assumes some new underlying dynamic that will continue to
exert a force on judicial decisionmaking. There are a variety of possi-
ble explanations for the purported shift to normalization, however,
that would not involve such a dynamic. For example, if the shift to
normalization was initiated because of a sense immediately after the
end of the Cold War that foreign relations had become less dangerous
and consequential, it is not clear why the shift should be expected to
continue after the emergence of new threats, such as global terrorism
and heightened geopolitical struggles with countries like Russia and
China. On the other hand, if part of what is going on is that a majori-
ty of the Supreme Court has become more "formalist" in its approach
to constitutional and statutory interpretation, 68 the trend may hold on-
ly so long as the composition of the Court remains the same, and it
may produce normalization only when exceptionalism happens to con-
flict with formalism, which will not be true in all cases. (To take one
example, the formalist Justices were the ones who staked out (in dis-
sent) the exceptionalist position in Boumediene.69) Alternatively, a po-
litical science account of judicial decisionmaking might suggest that
the current Supreme Court's willingness to restrain presidential au-
thority is related to political ideology, including the fact that President
Obama is a Democrat and a majority of the Supreme Court consists of
Republican appointees. If so, the Court's approach might change de-
pending on the next presidential election.
Finally, the lack of an underlying theory weakens the authors'
normative claim that there should be additional "normalization" of
foreign relations law and that "courts and scholars should embrace the
normalization trend." 0 The authors view themselves, in contrast with
other scholars, as making an "across-the-board normative assault on
exceptionalism. 7 1 But without an account of why some areas of for-
67 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1o5.
68 See, e.g., Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts
Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380 (2o15).
69 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 826 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 827 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
70 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1o5.
71 Id. at 1920.
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eign relations law have become normalized, it is difficult to know
whether it would be desirable for additional areas to follow the same
pattern. Merely identifying a purported trend in the case law does not
itself establish a normative case for extending that trend. Again, if the
phenomenon of normalization is a function of particular cases that
have been decided by the Supreme Court in a particular period, it
would not necessarily follow that we would see - or that we would
want to see - the emergence of a uniform approach.
CONCLUSION
Whether or not one agrees with the authors' claims, Normalization
makes important observations about the direction of U.S. foreign rela-
tions law, at least as that law is interpreted and applied by the Su-
preme Court. It also provides a useful counterpoint to the tendency
among some scholars to generalize about the differences between do-
mestic law and foreign relations law. Ultimately, however, the reader
is left uncertain about what constitutes foreign relations
exceptionalism, whether there has been a genuine shift away from it,
why such a shift might have occurred, and whether it is normatively
attractive.
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